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Abstract
We present an add-on for the Android platform, capable
of intercepting nearly all interactions between apps or
apps with the platform, including arguments of method
invocations in a human-readable format. A prelimi-
nary performance evaluation shows that the performance
penalty of our solution is roughly comparable with sim-
ilar tools in that area. The advantage of our solution,
however, is that it is truly modular in the sense that we
do not actually modify the Android platform itself, and
can include it even with an already running system. Pos-
sible uses of such an add-on are manifold; we discuss
one from the area of runtime verification that aims at im-
proving system security.
1 Introduction
In a nutshell, monitoring a system means gaining state
information while it executes, for example, for the pur-
pose of profiling (cf. [14]) or security hardening (cf.
[5, 13, 1]), the latter being also our motivation al-
though our technical contribution is entirely application-
agnostic. For Android, efficient monitoring relies on
having access to low-level (and under normal circum-
stances inaccessible) system events, such as Linux sys-
tem calls, for example, that are generated by the running
apps. Existing monitoring approaches are roughly distin-
guishable as being either app- or platform-centric: while
the former basically rewrite and repackage apps under
scrutiny in order to intercept the relevant events and app
interactions, the latter are usually known to rely on modi-
fications to some key system components of the Android
platform, such as its API, virtual machine (Dalvik VM),
the various system services, C/C++ libraries, the OS ker-
nel, and whatever else is needed for an application at
hand. In this paper, we present a monitoring add-on for
Android, which is platform-centric, yet does not require
such comprehensive system modifications.
As app-centric monitoring does not even require root
access to the Android platform, it, arguably, has an edge
over the platform-centric approaches described in the lit-
erature, as far as usability goes. For example, AppGuard
[1], which manages the modification and repackaging
process of untrusted apps entirely on a user’s “off the
shelf” phone has been downloaded more than one mil-
lion times, hinting at the fact that it is not just used by
a select group of domain experts—on the contrary [1].
However, the ease in usability comes at the expense of
some inherent vulnerabilities, namely that the added se-
curity controls and event interception code are actually
being executed within the very same (Java) app they are
meant to keep an eye on. AppGuard redirects method
calls in the Java layer by altering method references in
the Dalvik VM, but cannot take note of system calls that
are happening deeper down the stack. Aurasium [13],
another app-centric monitoring tool, works by redirect-
ing low-level function pointers away from an app’s dy-
namically linked Bionic C library to a security monitor,
which only gives users the desired security benefits if
the modified app does not provide its own C library—
for whatever reason. Besides, decompiling and changing
third-party apps usually violates the licence agreement
and destroys their original signatures and therefore the
ability to automatically update in the future. However,
AppGuard solves this particular problem by also taking
control over updates for the “patched” apps.
The platform-centric approaches described in the lit-
erature (cf. [5, 8, 3, 10, 11]) generally tie deeper into the
platform, and so they need to find ways to cope with the
extensive market fragmentation surrounding the Android
platform (cf. [9]); that is, they have to make sure that
their changes are ported to various versions of the OS as
well as to different hardware platforms, some of which
do not lend themselves well to running custom-built An-
droid versions, due to closed-source device drivers, for
example. TaintDroid [5] is a pioneering platform-centric
tool for taint flow analysis, which requires modifica-
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tions beginning from the OS kernel all the way up to the
Dalvik VM. Although it is being actively ported to newer
versions of Android since its inception, users of vendor-
specific Android releases may find it difficult to use, un-
less they are sufficiently experienced to not only compile
their own version of Android, including the TaintDroid
changes, but also to make it work on a hardware plat-
form of their choice. On the other hand, these deep ties
into the platform enable analyses that go beyond what is
possible with app-centric tools, since information can be
tracked down to the OS kernel level as is needed for taint
flow analysis.
Our approach, conceptually, is a combination of the
advantages of app- and platform-centric monitoring; that
is, to offer a software add-on that can be loaded even into
a currently running Android system, yet is able to trace
app interactions all the way down to the OS kernel level.
Technically, this functionality is mostly provided by an
OS kernel module, which uses Linux’ own kernel debug-
ging facility (called kprobes1) to intercept system calls
(see also §2). As such, our approach is strictly platform-
centric and does not just apply to specifically prepared
apps, but everything that is executed on the system. In
fact, we are able to intercept Android’s own inter pro-
cess communication (IPC) mechanism called Binder,2
and can therefore gather information on almost all possi-
ble interactions between apps and the Android platform
or via the platform. However, as platform-centric ap-
proach, we too require root privileges, if only to load
the module. This may seem restrictive, but one should
keep in mind that it has become somewhat common
practice to obtain root privileges on unlocked devices
in order to use custom ROMs like CyanogenMod,3 in-
stall utilities like firewalls or packet filters, or to be able
to edit system files. Our add-on is available as open
source software under the moniker DroidTracer from
http://kuester.multics.org/DroidTracer/.
In the remainder, we will shed some light on Droid-
Tracer’s internals (§2), how it may be put to good use
(§3), and discuss its performance overhead (§4). Some
conclusions are given in §5.
2 How It All Works
In a nutshell, our add-on implements two different but
complementary means of event monitoring: firstly, it
directly intercepts relevant Linux system calls and sec-
ondly, it intercepts IPC calls via Android’s internal com-
munication infrastructure called Binder (see below).
1https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/kprobes.txt
2http://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Binder.html
3http://www.cyanogenmod.org
System Call Interception Normally, Android apps,
which are executed on a Java virtual machine and with-
out root privileges, do not directly trigger system calls.
Instead they request via a Java API that some service be
used, or some resource be allocated. These high-level
requests eventually translate into a sequence of system
calls that ultimately make the kernel open a file, send
something to a (virtual) device, etc. Our kernel mod-
ule contains handler methods that get invoked by small
bits of code (so called probes) that are dynamically in-
serted by kprobes at almost arbitrary kernel addresses,
corresponding to the respective system calls. For exam-
ple, to check if an app eventually reads from (or writes
to) a file on the SD card, we break into the system call
sys open() and check if its argument, filename, which
always holds the full path of a file to open, contains the
sub-string “sdcard”. Similarly, we can track down every
internet connection established by an app, independent
of the API version in use, by checking in sys connect()
if the socket address family is of type AF INET (resp.
AF INET6), and so forth.
Alternatively, we could have placed hooks directly
into the high-level service handlers or the various system
services of the platform, like [8, 3, 10, 11] do, in order
to be notified when relevant events take place. Although
this is possible and sometimes unavoidable, as in the case
of TaintDroid, since taint flow analysis requires seamless
tracking of control and data flows, this has the disadvan-
tage that such hooks are specific to particular platform
releases and, generally, not portable. Besides, the func-
tionality provided by our kernel module can be entirely
switched on or off without rebooting or modifying the
system.
Binder Interception Binder is Android’s main com-
munication infrastructure between apps and system ser-
vices and it implements the popular remote method in-
vocation (RMI) scheme. Essentially it lets an object
running in one Dalvik VM invoke methods on an ob-
ject running in another Dalvik VM. This communica-
tion is exemplified in Fig. 1. It shows an app that at-
tempts to send an SMS by using methods provided by
the class SmsManager. This class, however, is more
of an interface rather than the actual implementation
of the service which does the sending. What is actu-
ally happening is that the SmsManager invokes a so
called proxy which compactly encodes arguments and
data types of SmsManager::sendTextMessage(), for ef-
ficient transmission via the Binder kernel driver. The
class android.os.Parcel is the corresponding container
for this data, also providing the required encoding and
decoding methods. The parcel is then received by
com.android.internal.telephony.ISms.Stub, which is the
counterpart of the proxy and which takes care of the de-
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Figure 1: An app accessing Android’s system services via Binder (left) and our add-on (right).
coding. The stub, in turn, invokes IccSmsInterfaceM-
anagerProxy::sendText() with the arguments originally
intended for sendTextMessage() to tell the GSM driver
(not depicted) to do the physical transmission of said
message.
The communication with Binder basically fol-
lows a stringent communication protocol between
sender and target. By hooking into the function
binder thread write() of its kernel driver, we are able
to tell when a new communication session commences;
that is, when a sender has triggered the transmission
of the BC TRCANSACTION signal. Specifically, this
signal (defined inside binder.h along with other pro-
tocol signals) indicates that the custom C structure,
binder transaction data (also defined inside binder.h),
has been initialised at a set address in memory. It con-
tains, amongst others, information on the sender, method
arguments, and the method name—although compactly
and not human-readable encoded (see paragraph on data
extraction below). We read this information from the
structure before the kernel copies it into the address space
of the target process.
Naturally, one can also intercept system events and
messages later in the control flow; for example, when
the IccSmsInterfaceManagerProxy communicates with
the kernel driver of the radio device. At this late stage,
however, one would lose the information about the origi-
nal sender app of an SMS, since its Linux User ID (UID),
which uniquely identifies an app on the Android plat-
form, is not passed to the kernel. In other words, we
would see that an SMS is being sent, but not by whom.
As system services check the permission of the client
based on its UID, Android uses Binder to communi-
cate said UID directly to the service (by writing the field
sender euid inside binder transaction data). Via this in-
direction, it is not possible for a rogue process to directly
query a service, using a fake UID, for example. These
observations suggest to us that there are no real alterna-
tives to intercepting system events and communication at
the level of Binder, if one is interested not only in the oc-
currence of certain events, but also in the associated meta
data.
Data Extraction Our interception of Binder lets us
monitor every API method invocation, but name, types
and data of arguments as well as caller and callee are ei-
ther dropped or compactly encoded (i.e., marshalled) in
terms of abstract IDs for efficiency reasons. Therefore,
we also need to concern ourselves with unmarshalling
the data once intercepted; that is, determine which pro-
cess/app tries to send an SMS, what its content is, who
the recipient is, etc.
To that end, we have realised DroidTracerService (see
right upper corner of Fig. 1), a user space app without
its own GUI. It serves mainly two purposes: On the one
hand, it acts as an interface between the kernel module
and Android’s “unmarshalling algorithms, on the other
hand, it is able to pass the intercepted system events on to
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a client app (cf. §3 for an example). As such it is similar
to a classical system library, which provides an API for
third-party apps to use rather than a dedicated GUI.
Unmarshalling Binder communication, however, is
not something that is typically done by apps. In fact,
there is no public API for this task nor any complete
documentation on the marshalling algorithms that would
allow users to devise their own implementations easily.
Hence, we reverse engineered this whole process to some
extent, to be able to use the official unmarshalling meth-
ods of Android’s android.os.Parcel. This has the advan-
tage that our solution ends up using the same methods
that are being used by the Binder communication any-
ways, and is therefore not specific to particular versions
of the Android OS.
We discovered that android.os.Parcel provides a
method to fill its internal data structure from a byte array.
Thus, we can create a Parcel object directly from the in-
tercepted field buffer inside binder transaction data, to
apply the Android specific unmarshalling methods to it,
namely, readString(), readInt(), readFloat(), etc. How-
ever, we cannot access arguments easily, as a Parcel ob-
ject for efficiency is missing the information about the
order in which they appear; that is, we have to invoke
the unmarshalling methods in the right oder to read the
encoded arguments from it correctly. In the offical un-
marshalling process, the stub knows how its proxy has
encoded the arguments using the counterpart methods
writeString(), writeInt(), writeFloat(), etc. By examin-
ing several proxy classes, we then observed they usually
marshall the method arguments in the same order they
appear in the corresponding method’s signature. We can
access the signature and with it the ordering and the types
of the arguments via reflection, but only under the pre-
requisite of having the called interface and method name
revealed and at hand first. For our example in Fig. 1 this
information is com.android.internal.telephony.ISms and
sendText(). We found out that the interface name is al-
ways encoded first (before the method arguments) in a
Parcel object; this is, for the stub to read and ensure that
the proxy called its correct counterpart. We can access
it by applying writeString(). In terms of decoding the
called method name, binder transaction data leaves us
with an integer, called code. A closer look at several
stub classes reveals that the mapping of code to its ac-
cording method name is, in fact, defined there. For ex-
ample, in com.android.internal.telephony.ISms.Stub the
method sendText(), is encoded in terms of a variable
static final int TRANSACTION sendText = 5.
If the according proxy class sends this code through
Binder, the stub uses it to first trigger the correct unmar-
shalling and second, the execution of sendText(). As the
suffix of TRANSACTION sendText equals the method
name, we are able to use reflection to extract it.
Marshalling methods exist only for Java primitives,
and some other types, such as Binder references, prim-
itive arrays, etc. But more complex objects can be
sent through Binder, too; that is, if they implement the
method createFromParcel() of the interface Parcable to
define how they can be encoded using Parcel’s standard
marshalling methods. We can invoke createFromPar-
cel() via reflection in most cases, and are thus able to
cover most argument types appearing in method calls.
This is crucial, as once we miss unmarshalling one ar-
gument for a method call, we cannot access remaining
arguments in the rest of Parcel object’s byte array.
Kernel/User-Space Communication As event inter-
ception takes place solely inside the kernel space and
unmarshalling relies on Android’s Java API, we need a
mechanism that allows us to pass data from inside the
kernel space up to an app. Moreover, we need some
means to let the user control the kernel module for even
the most basic tasks, for example, to switch event inter-
ception on or off from an app. However, Android has no
built-in way to serve as a solution, but we were able to
use netlink,4 which is a socket based mechanism of the
Linux kernel that can bidirectionally communicate with
user space. We placed the implementation of the com-
munication endpoints into our kernel module and into
our app, and thus, leave the Android framework as such
completely unmodified. As the Android API does not
offer netlink support, we had to build a custom netlink
endpoint for our app, using the Netlink Protocol Library
Suite (libnl5). It runs as a shared C++-library, droid-
tracer.so (see Fig. 1), in the same process as our app. We
had to extract the core functionality for netlink from libnl
and recompile it for Android devices using Android’s
Native Developer Kit (NDK). Netlink allows to declare
a callback method to receive kernel data, so that droid-
tracer.so does not have to poll our kernel module for
events. As the ultimate goal is to transmit them all the
way to DroidTracerService we use reflection and Java
Native Interface (JNI) to register a method in Java that is
automatically triggered if we forward data received from
netlink to it.
3 Use Cases—Runtime Verification
As already pointed out in § 1, there is a myriad of reasons
why users may want to closely monitor their mobile de-
vices. Although our add-on is application-agnostic, our
motivation is to bring techniques developed in the area
of runtime verification (cf. [4, 2]) closer to Android. In
4http://www.linuxfoundation.org/collaborate/workgroups/
networking/generic netlink howto
5http://www.carisma.slowglass.com/ tgr/libnl/
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a nutshell, runtime verification subsumes tools and tech-
niques that aim at checking that a system’s actual be-
haviour agrees to a (formal) specification of pre-defined
behaviour. For example, one could specify that “no in-
stalled app should ever send an SMS to a phone num-
ber, which is not stored in the user’s contacts list,” us-
ing a dedicated temporal logic, for example. Arguably,
a major focus in runtime verification research right now
is to be able to monitor not just reactive, but also data-
intensive systems, where one not only needs to know
that a message was sent, but also by who and to whom
(cf. keynote speech “Runtime Verification with Data”
by M. Leucker at the Runtime Verification conference
2013, Rennes, France). Temporal logics and regular ex-
pressions, traditionally used in that domain are typically
not sufficient to express such parameterised behavioural
policies, and if they are (cf. [4]), there is usually no tool
support for the domain that concerns us.
A recent paper [2], introduces a general purpose mon-
itoring algorithm for a parameterised logic, which we
have implemented as a client that directly utilises the API
of the DroidTracer add-on. The above policy can be for-
malised in this logic and be applied to any app installed
on the phone. To that end, our client provides a graphical
front-end that lists all the installed apps of a device and
users can choose which ones are being monitored simply
by clicking on its name in a list.
Although our approach is platform-centric, we give
users the possibility to exempt certain apps from be-
ing monitored, mainly for two reasons: firstly, to avoid
false negatives in case certain apps are more trustwor-
thy than others, and secondly, for performance reasons,
since our runtime verification client, internally, instanti-
ates one runtime verification monitor per app and pol-
icy.6 Therefore, the fewer apps are being monitored, the
less overhead and disruption for the rest of the system.
Note that, in an abstract sense, the aforementioned
tools such as AppGuard are also runtime verification
tools. However, rather than employing tools and tech-
niques developed in the area of runtime verification di-
rectly, they use alternative means to define security poli-
cies (in case of AppGuard, for example, security au-
tomata that have been introduced by Schneider [12]).
Also, off the shelf security automata are not suitable as
a fully declarative policy specification language over po-
tentially infinite data domains (e.g., set of all IPs, email
addresses, etc.).
6In the worst-case, monitors are of exponential size wrt. a policy,
depending on the policy as well as concretely observed system be-
haviour [2].
4 Performance Overhead
When our add-on is being executed with our runtime ver-
ification client on, the average performance overhead is
38.6%. This was determined on a Nexus 7 (1st genera-
tion) tablet with a quad-core CPU and 1 GB RAM run-
ning Android OS 4.3. We used seven test apps, specifi-
cally written for our purpose, i.e., each of the apps was
designed to generate 100 runs of up to 10,000 events of
the following sorts: 1. access the device ID (IMEI), 2.
read the SIM card serial number, 3. request location, 4.
send SMS, 5. look up list of installed apps, 6. access
connection status about all network types, and 7. read
file from SD card. Besides monitoring the policy intro-
duced in §3, namely that no app shall send a text mes-
sage to a number not recorded in the user’s contacts list,
we have instantiated the policies used in [2] to cover a
somewhat broader range of possible applications. How-
ever, as the results of these test runs are specific only
to our implementation of runtime verification, we also
need to measure the performance overhead of our “bare
bones” add-on when no further analysis is undertaken.
Table 1, shows the execution time when intercepting the
API method calls of the above eight events in three differ-
ent modes of operation: First, we ran the test apps with-
out our add-on enabled to get a reference execution time
for the unmodified system. Second, we enabled only
the event interception part of our add-on but no further
event processing, and thirdly, we added unmarshalling
and netlink communication to it in order to determine
whether or not there is a performance penalty associated
with how we process the intercepted information back in
user space.
As the results show, the actual performance overhead
of using just our kernel module with kprobes is only
2.51–3.92%, whereas the complete performance over-
head, when including netlink and unmarshalling, is 8.81–
17.35%. During the experiments, we ran all four cores
of the Nexus 7 on a fixed frequency rate using the perfor-
mance governor, which allowed us to reduce the margin
of error dramatically. Note that we left cells empty in
Table 1, where overhead could not significantly be de-
termined wrt. the t-test for the 95% confidence interval.
What is noteworthy is that getDeviceId() and getSimSe-
rialNumber() have significant lower overhead than get-
LastKnownLocation() and sendTextMessage(), as both
former method signatures have no arguments that re-
quire unmarshalling. The call getLastKnownLocation()
has the highest overhead. A probable explanation seems
to be that its arguments contain several complex ob-
jects, for example, one of type LocationRequest. Their
unmarshalling involves additional reflection calls; that
is, to find and invoke the method createFromParcel(),
which a class has to implement, if it wants to be sent
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Table 1: Execution of Android API method calls (each up to 10,000 times) with and without DroidTracer. The margin
of error is given for the 95% confidence interval.
Interface Method Android Kprobes Add-on Kprobes Add-on
(in ms) (in ms) (in ms) (Overhead in %) (Overhead in %)
TelephonyManager getDeviceId 5309 ± 15 5517 ± 18 5811 ± 11 3.92 9.46
TelephonyManager getSimSerialNumber 5346 ± 16 5524 ± 16 5817 ± 7 8.81
LocationManager getLastKnownLocation 3516 ± 13 3562 ± 13 4126 ± 5 17.35
SmsManager sendTextMessage 9166 ± 13 9396 ± 13 10216 ± 10 2.51 11.46
PackageManager getInstalledApplications 15730 ± 204 15514 ± 202 15422 ± 172
ConnectivityManager getAllNetworkInfo 5769 ± 53 5841 ± 60 5671 ± 7
BufferedReader readLine 15360 ± 72 15531 ± 67 15455 ± 38
through Binder. As sendTextMessage() contains only
Java primitives as arguments, its unmarshalling overhead
is slightly lower.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Our benchmarks suggest that we sit comfortably be-
tween the competition. For example, Aurasium’s inter-
ception of getDeviceId() has a 35% and getLastLoca-
tion() a 34% performance overhead [13], whereas App-
Guard’s benchmarks range between 0.8 and 21.4% over-
head. TaintDroid, although more of a taint flow analysis
rather than a pure monitoring tool, has a performance
overhead of up to 29%, which is in the range of our mea-
surements of 38.6% average overhead with the runtime
verification client enabled. However, one should keep in
mind that unlike the other solutions, DroidTracer does
not rely on app or system modifications and therefore
has limited potential for optimisation. The fact that, in
particular, our kernel module performs well under these
constraints, is somewhat surprising but largely due to our
ability to intercept all the relevant data at a single point
of entry, i.e., the Binder. More so, we have shown that
detailed systems monitoring on Android is possible even
without any modifications to the platform itself.
However, this is preliminary work, a proof of concept.
While we are content with the event interception part of
our work and already offer an API, such that others can
use and benefit from it as is, we have yet to substantiate
our claim that runtime verification as outlined in particu-
lar in § 3 really is beneficial to system security. Works
that analyse current threats and security trends in that
area (cf. [15, 7, 6]) seem to suggest that the total num-
ber of Android attacks is on the rise, but that most of the
threats follow only a handful of different patterns. Our
working hypothesis is that these patterns can and should
be translated into (temporal logic) policies, which then
in turn are monitored by our tool. The essential ingredi-
ents for this undertaking were presented in this paper and
shown to work.
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